Can the EU Serve as an Integration Model for ASEAN?

Can the EU Serve as an Integration put for ASEAN?The age anile saying of theres more than one focus to skin a cat has served as a clichd phrase to adequately embellish and paint the canvas of the archetypal process, exemplar standard or the perfect specimen isnt the only path to triumph. This expression has been applicable as manner advice, in competitive sports, c beer choices, as well as habitual daily-life in achieving greatness, the idiom has also lent to International Relations. Cooperation at any level is considered an achievement in all respectful fields the office to set aside differences, identify vulgarity for a purpose and the overlapping determination in reaching that ambition. The conquest of cooperating in International Relations takes the form of nation states coming together in alliance on the basis of parking areaality towards an aspirant goal, furthering into nation states in kingdoms linking arms in pursuit for a collective objective. This profound bon d is the grouping of nation states in a region exuding behaviors as a collective who understand differences, identify communal interests and strive towards a unified goal. The faces of regionalization would be of the European Union, the EU, and the Association of southeastward Asiatic Nations or ASEAN. small-arm the two regional groupings waste been known to be successful, the level of desegregation between the two differ quite considerably. The EUs level of integration furthers ASEAN by many folds the ability to integrate not only areas for free trade, but the unification of the market, currency, common passport, a customs union and a commonality in foreign policy as a region all through a common existence. The overwhelming success of the European Union dwarfs that of ASEAN where the Asian tete-a-tete has only been able to achieve integration regionally through free trade and economical movement. The difference in level of integration begs the query of whether the EU s ticker has the ability to befit that of ASEAN and provide threadlines and indicate to be exemplar in regional integration. To begin whether the EU model is capable of providing as a structural guideline for ASEAN, we inspect the circumstances of the purpose each integration from its origins, and examine the validity of the two then remainsatically determine whether the EU model is capable of befitting that of ASEAN to achieve paralleling success in the East. The integration of the European Union isherald as the greatest union of nation states in a region, highest achievementin integration of a common currency, customs union, single market, commonpassport and foreign policy under a common institution. The ability for the parts to share sovereignty and surrender to a collective long-term goal of aregional cooperation above national interests creates a supportive surroundings inchanneling political will. The European Union marked the pioneer for regional integrationwhich exhibited a collective ideology of a community advance quite an than thetraditional balance of power mode accrediting Robert Schuman of France and KonradAndenauer of Germany. The collective to channel political will led to theconstruction of a legally binding common institution which over proverb the integrationproject. This Western model empowered the consensus approach with a pronged initiativeof solidarity and tolerance by not isolating any member regarding studydomestic issues of a banking crisis resulting in an increase in public debt.Greece represents the first test to the European Unions Single currencyresulting in a great increase in both public debt and deficit. The consensusapproach meant that Union were hesitant in decision-makings as well asimplementing policies until the vast majority of member states were pursued tocollectively pursue and implement such(prenominal) policies. The process of proposalspassed through the Working Party, then to the Permanent RepresentativesCommit tee (Coreper) then finally a Council contour secures that aproposal befits the interests of the entire Union. The willingness to providesignificant monetary transfer to help poorer members catch up with thecollective norm meant that stronger members in the Union saw the importance offinancial weaker nation states and speckled collective will power above domestic interestsbut meant a lag and a pull support on financial capabilities for further advancements.Under theleadership of France and Germany meant that Paris and Berlin were the driving forcebehind the EU integration, and under this leadership can attribute to thesuccess of the integration itself in the ability for the two countries tooverlook historic differences between the two and step together for a successof a better tomorrow. The tiny element that make regionalism successful inEurope in achieving the European Union was the ability to push asidedifferences the capability in reconciling diachronic pasts. With historica lreconciliation, especially between France and Germany with a turbulenthistorical past of the war of 1870, the First and Second World War. The reconciliation brought thecohesion that allowed for the development of race building and the indispensable political will for cooperation and at long last integration. Theachievement through years of sustained political effort from leaders of bothcountries paved way that facilitated the mend of commonality towards sculptinga regional community. This is a reflection of the European Unions ability andcommunity approach and through a common institution of the European EconmicCommunity formed a Free Trade Area, in as yet a Customs Union that led to aSingle securities industry and Single Currency. The regional cooperation of economics wasntthe limit as foreign policy overlapped amongst the members which allowed for acommon passport. These aspects and byproducts through political will inachieving an pressful common goal forged an atmosphere of peace, prosperityand security in the European environment. With an ambitious idea seen through to the very end can prove to solidify and validate the EU model of integration especially in its historical record of responding to crisis. The validity of cooperation is tested in the face of turmoil and with such response by the European Union model, this integration has proved time and time again that in crisis it has responded astoundingly, as well establish mechanisms that eliminate repetition failures. Crisis that brought leveraged adversity namely the failed plan for a European Community in 1954 led to the creation of the European Economic Community, the EEC, the empty chair crisis of 1965 led to the de facto adoption of the Qualified Majority Voting reflecting the consensus approach, QMV, and its eventual acceptance resulting in the 1986 Single European Act. A currency crisis of the 1980s birthed to the European Monetary System and ultimately the Euro, and finally the demise of communism in Europe led to the establishment of a common foreign and security policy paving way for the widest outburst EU members into the Unions integration.Inretrospect, there were many requirements that had to be met for numerous nationstates to come together in unison linked by interests. Requirements that placesthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the test in its own integration. The process of the European integration mayhave had the head start and set an face to other regions for the strive forregionalism but the European Union isnt without flaws, flaws that onceexamined may unveil why the Western model is ill suited for ASEAN. The EuropeanUnion has been the most developed model of regional integration, althoughhistorically through common institutions and the sharing of sovereignty forproblem solving, recent crises havent been handled well. jolted by an economicand financial crisis, and the lack of a timely and coherent response to theEurozone crisis called into question the integrity of the union and increaseddoubts of the integration process altogether. The financial crisis revealedstructural and institutional fault lines which led to a decline of the Westernorientated world power into one that gave rise to Asia and its market power.Mechanisms in place that aimed to reverse or buffer the effects of the economicand financial crisis were economic adjustments or austerity measures but cameoff as threatening towards domestic affairs. The adjustments allowed for the daintiness of political cohesion and stability the Lisbon conformity, also known asthe Reform Treaty, that replaced the European Constitution. One of major smorgasbords of the Lisbon Treaty will be the hot president of the European council withtwo and half year term which will replace the current presidency rotatingbetween member states every half a dozen months. Although the Lisbon Treaty sought areform that would restructure leadership, it paved way for a failure that wouldunde rmine the integrity of the shared collective that the European union heraldgreatly. The obstacle that the Lisbon Treaty faced was that Ireland placed theLisbon Treaty on referendum, and the Irish public did not accept the Treaty andrejected its ratification. With this wave of doubt in the ratification, the CzechSenate voted for the Lisbon but lacked the signatory approval of the Czechpresident, without such proved his Euro-Skeptic attitudes towards it sandfueled a demonstration of the Czech public who shared disapproval of thisTreaty. With this apparent failure convinced the interests to stray away fromany further institutional changes, More Europe, no more. This exampleexplores that a regional restricting that a shared collective no longer spreadsthe region evenly, the regions interest has slowly diminished and nationalinterests have overtaken decisions made in this Union. Evident of this change of heart is Germanys shift inperception, as one of the strongest advocate and champ of integration, Germanyleaned towards the doubter camp as well as issuing public doubts of theEurozone. The growing urgency rising from the problems of the European Union is that rapid integration without commensurate fortify of political and economic institutions. The emerging gaps can allow for lessons to be learned by other regional groupings in terms of institutional capacity and needed coordination in integration. The challenges that follows of the EU integration can be accredited to fiscal coordination, amidst a worsening of economic outlook the reform adjustments to cleanse the financial schema with austerity measures led to fragility of economies of EU member states wish Greece, Spain, Portugal and renewed speculation in the financial market. The second challenge that the European Union faces is a long-standing identity crisis, the Eurozone with 16 members, European Union members allotting at 27 issues a high number heterogeneity. The attachment of European capital to nati onal sovereignty and its hesitation to give power to Brussels for decision making lends to a decrease in the willingness to share sovereignty. On a recent note, at the Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009, the EU inability to collectively voice at the conference revealed the Unions weakness as an international actor. The induction of the conference ended with the EU agreeing to a deal that leaders of the region agreed that no deal would have been a better deal, endorsing a deal with no legal bindings, and an informal setting of promises to curb emissions speaks volumes on EU being unable to assert itself at the most critical conjugation on the world stage and stains the legacy of its integration and its ability to conform to differences and shared sovereignty in the region. If the deal wasnt endorsed, it would have rallied a collective of voices who share the sentiment that such a deal would make no changes to the environment. The European Union in many of its su ccesses poses numerous present-day challenges that undermine the achievements of this regional integration, its inability to respond to difficulties of a financial crisis and the burdening increase of doubt spreading throughout the region on the crumble of an aligned collective interest. The Asian counterpart to the European Union isthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations, also known as ASEAN. When foreignministers from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singaporecame together to sign the Bangkok Declaration on August 8th, 1976 itestablished this newly founded association, in hopes to manage and containintra-regional conflicts. The Association grew to ten members with theadditional Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The goal extended tomaintaining peace, and convey stability in a community marred by war toensure that each member is free to pursue domestic development in theirrespective nations. The success of ASEAN was the ability to house a communit yof nations whom were independent and sovereign with different historical pasts,multitudes in diversity of languages and beliefs and rarely any overlap ofculture to peacefully co-exist. Aspects of diversifying historical pasts, and intra-regionalconflicts didnt hinder the forging of the association, the ten Southeast Asiannations were able to overcome suspicions of one another and set aside latenthostilities. ASEAN in its root established a means ofnon-intervention and non-binding agreement, the inability to impose disciplineson any of its members. The approach to the ASEAN model is under the foundationof consultation and consensus which allows for a decision found on the majoritybefore implementation. In attesting the ASEAN model, the process and approachto solving issues relies on the ASEAN Way that reflects and respects culturalnorms in Southeast Asia, A running(a) process or style that is informal and personal. Policymakers constantly utilize compromise consensus, and consult ation in the informal decision-making process. Quiet diplomacy allows ASEAN leaders to communicate without bringing the discussions into the public view. (Masilamni and Peterson) ASEAN did indeed progress but without flawsand missteps of their own, this Asian collective failed to resemble theprogress of the EU with historical pasts un gruntled and still damagingrelationships between Southeast Asian members. For example, the dispute of thePreah Vihear Temple located in Cambodia standing as a World Heritage site, struggledto resolve with Thailand. The historical site stands on Kampuchean sovereigntybut was under Thai occupation until Cambodias independence in 1954. The UN hasgranted that Thailand remove military personnel as the site genuinely belongsto Cambodia, this territorial dispute has sparks major clashes between theb station of the neighboring Southeast Asian countries. One settled by the UnitedNations through the International appeal of Justice but stands as contentionbetw een Cambodia and Thailand. Reconciliation hasnt been an agenda between thetwo over a 900-year-old Hindu temple. Althoughthere are territorial disputes, and misalignment in political institutions, ASEANis by far the most advanced of cooperatives amongst the efforts to regionalgroupings, taking the EU not by emulation but by examples. The ability forASEAN to adapt progress of the integration model of the EU into ASEANapplicable means plays homage to the ASEAN way of doing things that aresometimes unorthodox and against the grain. An example of utilize the EU as anexemplar breathing in and not by example is regularly sending delegates toBrussels to seek ideas from the EU experience. In this admiration ofinspiration of the ASEAN of the progress of the EU, displays elements thatdiffer from the Asian Association to that of the European Union and how theWestern model isnt necessary applicable to befit the Asian. ASEAN establishesa strictly inter-governmental body, with no interest in or indication ofrelinquishing means to share sovereignty between the nation members, andadditionally, for ASEAN to emulate the EU model would require the ASEAN membersto prerequisite a certain set of requirements to progress into integrationbased the EU model. Requirements that predetermine that integration breedsmutual political will and shared beliefs in the success of the long-term goalof the high level of integration is historical reconciliation for ASEAN members.Reconciliation did not take place as the nations differed on many aspects forexampleWithout such reconciliation, the necessarypolitical will and shared belief towards a long-standing goal of integration onthe merits of shared sovereignty diminished which led to the trading trading operations andleader of ASEAN to be one of inter-governmental sooner than through a commoninstitution. Although ASEAN has made innumerable declarations to emulate theEuropean Union integration model, their words of rhetoric reflected in their actions as unmatched with their words. The present ASEAN development process poses a challenge to the traditional Anglo-Saxon capitalist models as it contested the reformed rules-based system of global governance. The pressure that the EU and the EU places on ASEAN members regarding labor, social environment, and human rights if seen through as a success in pressure assimilation, actually presents itself as a disadvantaging stage in the development of the Asian model if implemented as the model itself is far beyond Western pressures to curb issues. The ideology of ASEAN itself corporate the ASEAN Way, a means of consultation and consensus, similar to that of the EU model but in the Eastern agenda, practiced non-interference with non-binding agreements to accompany decisions made and policies to follow. The problem with an open-ended agreement meant no enforcement to curb behaviors and the inability to impose disciplines, essentially heavy-hearted words with empty actions to fulfill promises. ASEANs point of enlargement on taking new members in 1997 introduced members of Myanmar and Laos with the expectation to solve and contain regional problems with Myanmar at the time housed a closed economy with a military regime as leadership, economic crisis and cross-border pollution. The trifecta of expectations created the illusion of integration with the confidence between members but instead exhibited loose inter-governmental cooperation. Myanmars triple threat posed a threat to an initiating cooperative of its region members but ASEAN overlooked this threat and extended the membership regardless.The incorporation of countries like Myanmarwith its military regime and closed economy represented a new extremum inASEANs diversity. This in itself would have tested the Associations claim todeeper integration as ASEAN has not found a way to reconcile its breadth withits attempts to achieve a greater depth of integration (Henderson 1999, 74-76).The ASEAN Way became a mean s to avoid quite than solve issues and conflict, the complementing of informal operationsand non-binding agreements enforce no tangible means of success andintegration. The ASEAN Way in this examination doesnt pose as a threat to theintegration of its members but rather examined through a behavioral lens ofinformality in actions that isnt present in the European Union attributes, thelack of formal operations and behaviors may ill-fit the EU model.The inceptions of the European Unionjuxtaposed with the later formation of ASEAN provides a historical overview onthe ability in identifying commonalities and interests for the two groups ofnations coming together as a collective. In their respective collectives, ASEANand the EU share numerous elements that prove their successful integration, buthaving the EU being the superior model lends the thought of the surmiseto befit the Western model with the Eastern. With the two models explained anddeciphered, we resume the suitability in befitti ng the EU model within thefixtures of the ASEAN structure. The two are known and documented as both elicitingeconomic integration and community building to both foster and maintainsecurity as well as further economic development. The best description ofASEANs use of the existing EU model without imposition from the Union to befitguidelines would be admiration, not emulation, this pronounces volumes on theactions ASEAN have already undertaken from both the successes and failures ofthe European Union. The admiration and not emulation can be attributed toskepticisms especially with Brexit and the consequences of the post-event inaddition to EU-style regional integration increases doubt on the validity ofnot the EU model but its emulated nature on ASEANs. ASEANs inability andlatent behavior to reconcile historical past illustrates the initial step ofASEANs incapability in emulating the EU model. ASEAN has never been moreunanimous on the need for greater integration, but the capacity to make thenecessary domestic political and economic adjustments to implement the reformsthat are necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of integration in unevenamongst the different ASEAN member states. The late former secretariate toASEAN, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, elaborated that the EU served as an inspiration forASEAN but never a model. An inspiration to guide ASEAN rather than an imposedsteer of how-to suggests a road school principal to demise. Modelsin their generality suggest emulation but downplays acquire, without learningit inhibits growth, change and innovation, emulation doesnt produce lessonslearned and nor does it generate dynamic innovators but rather passive mimics.ASEAN can adopt many aspects and successes of the European Union but merely asan inspiring element and not a full-fledged guide as the two entities differ inmannerisms, operations and behaviors in their procedures that hinder suchtransfer of mimicking. The ASEAN Way of operations is the mannerisms that prohibits such transfer of guidelines and procedural operations housed by theEuropean Union, the Qualified Majority Vote suggests a similarity in theconsensus approach but the backroom conferences secluded from the public byASEAN members suggests differently. Emulation creates indwelling benchmarks which allows for no feasible alternatives to the dominant model, in the case ASEAN and EU, the imposition of EU onto ASEAN breeds a form of Eurocentrism. The imposition by the EU regardless of validity of model strikes a force by the West onto Asia which romances dominance, although the European Union exhibits soft power with inclinations on intrinsic values, there are other means of effrontery rather than projected imposition. The imposed force from the West, although in good intent to improve and expand markets in the East, presents itself as a dominant force by the West to handle the East. This imposition and emulation of the EU model would have viewed as the West to overtake the Eas t, and with the current rise of China, Asian nation states wish not to look beyond the Pacific for inspiration let alone a steer from elsewhere. The necessities that ASEAN must take in orderto inspiringly succeed like the European Union and not simply emulate it wouldbe to learn from the Unions failures and adapting it to ASEAN in a manner thanpreserves inter-governmental operations as well promote unifying political willin attaining a long-term goal of sustained integration. An investment thatASEAN can consider follow in the footsteps of the Union would be placingnational governments interests of achieving long term goal of regionalintegration by all member states above domestic priorities. The push forintegration should be one that synchronizes the public as well as thegovernment that It is in their vital national interest to integrate. Theseelements borrow the attributes that the European Union succeeds on and adaptsit to the ASEAN model, this inspiration proves key points for AS EAN to improvein its own integration but suggests that the EU model needs improvement inorder to be applied. The learning of the crisis in Europe that threatens theEuropean Union fuels the need for ASEAN to take inspiration from the EU modelrather than at total replicating. The merits of the European Union serve asinspiration for ASEAN integration and not as a total guideline for theSoutheast Asian collective, the missteps and struggles of the EU model provideslearning points for ASEAN to improve and implement, the successes of overcomehistorical differences between regional members provides reflection thatdifferences in Southeast Asia are still prominent. The EU model holisticallyill-fits the ASEAN model by the diversifying approach by the two collectives, theevolved formality of operations by each differ considerably and the approach tocrisis cements that each deal with struggles in differently. The European Unionstill stands as the most successful regional collective to integrate upon acommon goal, this Union presents itself as an exemplary model of both trialsand tribulations of nations integrating, one that ASEAN views praiseworthily and inspired.Success takes many forms and there is no single paved way to achieve it, theEuropean Union represents one road to success and its success speaks volumesthat outdo their struggles that on the world stage provides lessons forinspired regions to integrate. As for the Association of Southeast AsianNations, it is adamant that ASEAN will make its own Way in achieving a highlevel of integration one that doesnt mimic the EU model but mirrors in itssuccess. BibliographyThe European Unionas a Model for Regional Integration. Council on Foreign Relations. September24, 2010. https//www.cfr.org/report/european-union-model-regional-integration.Should the EU be considered a model for ASEAN? EastAsia Forum. August 05, 2017. 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